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I. FROM CREATION TO PROVIDENCE
1. The Aims of the Book
This book is the third in a series of three volumes. In 1997 and 1999,
Oxford’s Clarendon Press published my books The Metaphysics of Theism and
The Metaphysics of Creation, which are related, respectively, to Books I and II
of Thomas Aquinas’s Summa contra gentiles (SCG) as this book is to Book III.1
“Aquinas’s Natural Theology”—a subtitle these three volumes share
—identifies what I take to have been developed and presented in SCG
I–III.2 The subtitle may also suggest that this series of volumes is intended
primarily as a project in philosophical scholarship, presenting a historical
account and critical exposition of Aquinas’s thirteenth-century achieve-
ment.3 It’s certainly true that one reason I’ve had for undertaking this study
is my conviction that Aquinas’s systematic natural theology is a philosophi-
cally interesting historical subject that has been generally neglected, misun-
derstood, or simply unrecognized for what it is. And so my plan for these
three volumes does include trying to present, explain, and evaluate the
treatments of several essential topics in each of the three parts of his natural
theology. I hope these books will, in that way, make a contribution to
medieval philosophical scholarship.4
But other considerations have also motivated me, considerations that
make Aquinas’s natural theology philosophically important, I think, as well
as interesting. They have led me to approach it not merely as the monumen-
tal achievement it already was when Aquinas completed it in 1265, but also
as the classic version of an ambitious theory that invites extrapolation and
sometimes needs correcting in its details.5 Viewed in that way, this natural
theology is a continuing enterprise for which Aquinas’s work has provided
rich material developed in promising patterns. So in this book, as in The
Metaphysics of Theism (TMOT) and The Metaphysics of Creation (TMOC), I
mean also to engage in that enterprise in ways that will, I hope, encourage
the critical cooperation of others in pursuing the development of a wide-
ranging natural theology along the lines Aquinas drew.
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2. Aquinas’s Natural Theology
In my view a great deal—not all—of theology’s traditional subject matter is
really continuous with philosophy’s subject matter and ought to be inte-
grated with it in practice. Most philosophers who lived before the twentieth
century would share that view, and no substantive developments in the last
hundred years should have obscured it. In the first three quarters of the
twentieth century it surely was obscured, but we have recently been witness-
ing a development in which that view is no longer so hard to find among
philosophers. As late-twentieth-century theologians have been moving away
from their traditional, doctrinal subject matter, philosophers have been
moving in.6 And natural theology, a branch of philosophy, interests me
especially because it provides the traditional and still central means of
integrating (some of) theology with philosophy.
I presented my conception of natural theology in detail in TMOT’s
introduction and first chapter; I don’t think that the details need rehearsing
here. But for a concise, general account of natural theology’s nature and
status, independent of any particular concern with Aquinas’s work, I
couldn’t do better than to offer William Alston’s view of the discipline in
this passage from his Perceiving God: The Epistemology of Religious Experience:
Natural theology is the enterprise of providing support for religious
beliefs by starting from premises that neither are nor presuppose any
religious beliefs. We begin from the mere existence of the world, or the
teleological order of the world, or the concept of God, and we try to
show that when we think through the implications of our starting point
we are led to recognize the existence of a being that possesses attributes
sufficient to identify Him as God. Once we get that foothold we may
seek to show that a being could not have the initial attributes without
also possessing certain others; in this manner we try to go as far as we
can in building up a picture of God without relying on any supposed
experience of God or communication from God, or on any religious
authority. (p. 289)
The view Alston takes in this passage is broad by comparison with the more
familiar notion of natural theology, which limits it to attempts to argue for
(or against) the existence of God.7 His view could serve well as a sketch of
Aquinas’s undertaking in SCG I, which Aquinas describes as covering “mat-
ters associated with God considered in himself” (I.9.57)8—that is, the sub-
ject matter of what might fairly be called classical natural theology: the
existence of something whose inferred nature constitutes a prima facie basis
for identifying it as God, and the further aspects of God’s nature that can
be inferred in working out the implications of that starting point.
But an even broader view of natural theology is called for if it is to
include the topics Aquinas goes on to develop in SCG II and III—a view
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almost as broad as the one Alston takes up soon after presenting the one
we’ve been considering:
This characterization of natural theology [—the one quoted above—]
sticks closely to the classically recognized “arguments for the existence
of God,” but it need not be construed that narrowly. It also includes
attempts to show that we can attain the best understanding of this or
that area of our experience or sphere of concern—morality, human
life, society, human wickedness, science, art, mathematics, or what-
ever—if we look at it from the standpoint of a theistic . . . metaphysics.
(p. 289)
The idea of a natural theology that goes far beyond arguments for God’s
existence is one Alston shares with Aquinas, as can be seen in detail in SCG
II and  III. I think it’s quite likely that Aquinas believes, too, that the
explanatory capacity of natural theology is in theory universal—as Alston
suggests with his “or whatever.” But the idea Aquinas puts into practice in
SCG is less broad than the one Alston outlines here. Aquinas does take up
some of the broad topics Alston lists, and a few more besides. But he
expressly excludes the concerns of natural science from the scope of the
project he’s engaging in, and he shows no unmistakable signs of having
thought about including art or mathematics.9 Still, Alston’s implied charac-
terization of natural theology as theistic metaphysics is very like what Aqui-
nas seems to have had in mind generally—as the titles of my books are
meant to suggest, and as I think their contents show.
In  TMOT,  I dealt  only  with  the topics of SCG’s Book I, “matters
associated with God considered in himself.” In TMOC, I dealt with the
topics of Book II, which Aquinas describes as “the emergence of created
things from him.” In this third and last volume, I deal with the topics of
Book III, “the ordering and directing of created things toward him as their
goal” (I.9.57). As even Aquinas’s short descriptions of the three parts of his
natural theology may suggest, it’s intended to integrate a great many topics
that would ordinarily be treated separately, and differently, in other
branches of philosophy—branches recognizable not only in the Aristotelian
philosophy he knew best, but also in the philosophy of the late twentieth
century—including, for example, metaphysics, philosophy of mind, episte-
mology, and ethics.10 Integrating all those topics by means of natural theol-
ogy involves developing within this particular branch of philosophy some of
the  subject  matter  specifically associated with theology  as it developed
outside philosophy in the three great monotheisms, in the form of “re-
vealed” or “dogmatic” theology, based on scriptural exegesis. That, of
course, is what makes this branch of philosophy natural theology: investigat-
ing, by means of analysis and argument, at least the existence and nature of
God and, in the fuller development characteristic of Aquinas’s project, the
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relation of everything else—but especially of human nature and behav-
ior—to God considered as reality’s primary source and ultimate goal.
But developing parts of that subject matter within philosophy of course
requires forgoing appeals to any putative revelation or religious experience
as evidence for the truth of propositions, and taking for granted only those
few naturally evident considerations that traditionally constitute data ac-
ceptable for philosophy generally.11 That’s what makes it natural theology.
Aquinas’s natural theology does, however, make a restricted, philo-
sophically tolerable use of propositions he considers to have been divinely
revealed. Often at the end of a chapter in Book I, II, or III, after having
argued for some proposition in several different ways, each of which scru-
pulously omits any reference to revelation, he will cite Scripture by way of
showing that what has just been established by unaided reason agrees with
what he takes to be revealed truth.12 (For example, in I.20, after having
presented ten arguments to show that God is not in any way corporeal, he
observes that “divine authority concurs with this demonstrated truth,” cit-
ing three biblical passages, including John 4:24: “God is a spirit . . .”
[I.20.188].) On those occasions he certainly does not take himself to be
introducing a revealed text in order to remove doubts about natural theol-
ogy’s results; they are, after all, the results of “natural reason, to which
everybody is compelled to assent” (I.2.11). “Divine authority” is not invoked as
support for propositions occurring as premises or conclusions in the logical
structure of SCG I–III.13
Scripture’s systematic contribution to Aquinas’s natural theology
should be thought of as primarily an aid to navigation, showing him his
destinations and practicable routes to them in a rational progression. From
any one of the propositions previously argued for in the systematic develop-
ment of his natural theology, unaided reason could, in theory, validly derive
infinitely many further propositions. But Aquinas’s systematic natural the-
ology, like the presentation of any well-defined subject matter in a series of
connected arguments, is more expository than exploratory.14 It is designed
to show, primarily, that reason unsupported by revelation could have come
up with many—not all—of just those propositions that constitute the estab-
lished subject matter of what he takes to be revealed theology. But that
design requires that reason be guided by what he takes to be revelation.
Whatever may be said of natural theology generally, Aquinas’s version of it
certainly is, as Alston puts it, “the enterprise of providing support for religious
beliefs by starting from premises that neither are nor presuppose any relig-
ious beliefs.”15 So Aquinas needs Scripture in these circumstances as provid-
ing the chart that guides his choice of propositions to argue for as well as a
list of specifications that can be consulted to see, first, that it is indeed one
and the same “truth that faith professes and reason investigates” (I.9.55)
and, second, “how the demonstrative truth is in harmony with the faith of
the Christian religion” (I.2.12). But his distinctive, primary aim in the first
three books of SCG is the systematic development of that demonstrative
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truth, up to the point at which the theism being argued for begins relying
on propositions that are initially accessible to reason only via revelation and
becomes distinctively Christian.
As I see it, then, SCG I–III is Aquinas’s most unified, systematic contri-
bution to the project of arriving at a thoroughly rational confirmation of
perfect-being theism generally, of showing the extent to which what had
been revealed might have been discovered, the extent to which “the invis-
ible things of God from the creation of the world” might be “clearly seen,
being understood by the things that are made” (Rom. 1:20). As such it is
addressed to every open-minded, reasoning person.16
3. Book III in Relation to Books I and II
It is a natural consequence of the systematic continuity of Books I–III that
Aquinas’s introductions to the books get shorter as he goes along. At the
very beginning of SCG, he uses nine chapters to provide an introduction
to the project generally as well as to the specific topics of Book I: matters
associated directly with God considered in himself. When, in Book II, he
moves beyond those topics to a consideration of God’s externally mani-
fested (or transeunt) activity, his introduction to the new material occupies
the book’s first five chapters. Partly as a consequence of the fact that those
two earlier introductions both help to prepare the ground for Book III’s
elaborate investigation of God as the primary governor of creation and its
ultimate goal, he needs only Chapter 1 for his specific introduction to
Book III.
In introducing Book II, Aquinas makes a point of emphasizing the
continuity between it and Book I. Of course, even a casual reader could
readily appreciate the general relevance of Book II’s new study of God’s
creation to Book I’s just-completed study of God; but Aquinas insists on the
indispensability of Book II’s contribution to the continuing study of God. In
Aquinas’s view of the first two books of SCG, it’s not as if in Book I he had
developed a rational investigation of God, and then in Book II he shifted
his focus in order to investigate creation in that same way. Instead, Book II’s
natural-theological study of God’s creation, as Aquinas conceives of it, is a
further study of God considered in his products, intended to enhance and
extend the results of the initial study of God considered in himself. That
strong continuity is just what should have been expected from Aquinas’s
initial statement of his plan for SCG I–III:
So, for us, intending to pursue by way of reason those things about God
that human reason can investigate, the first consideration is of matters
associated with God considered in himself; second, of the emergence of
created things from him; third, of the ordering and directing of created
things toward him as their goal. (I.9.57)
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And so creation and providence, the specific topics of Books II and III
respectively, are included among the things about God that unaided human
reason can investigate.
That single, fixed, primary focus of all three parts of this investigation
is what Aquinas’s general conception of theology, whether natural or re-
vealed, would also lead us to expect: “the discussion carried on in this
science is about God, for it is called ‘theo-logia’, which means the same as
‘discourse about God.’ Therefore, God is the subject of this science” (Summa
theologiae [ST] Ia.1.7, sc).17 And in the first chapter of Book II, Aquinas
describes the task for Books II and III combined, founded on Book I’s
accomplishments, as “the filled-out (completam) consideration  of  divine
truth”—that is, the truth about God (II.1.856).18
Exclusive concern with God or the truth about God might seem too
narrow for the broad conception of natural theology I’ve attributed to
Aquinas  and adopted myself,  a  conception  I’ve described  as  a sort of
Grandest Unified Theory, with the capacity of being ultimately explanatory
of absolutely everything.19 But that misgiving should be dispelled when we
find out what Aquinas thinks is included in the truth about God. Theology,
he says, has as its “main aim . . . to transmit a cognition of God, and not only
as he is in himself, but also as he is the source of [all] things, and their
goal—especially of the rational creature” (ST Ia.2, intro.). And so the
subject matter of theology is the truth about everything, with two provisos.
First, it is about God and about everything other than God, but only as
everything other than God relates to God as its source and its goal. Second,
it is about everything other than God as related to God in those ways, but
especially about human beings, for reasons that aren’t hard to supply in
general.20 Theology is about God considered in himself and considered in
the fundamentally explanatory source-and-goal relationships—primarily
the relationships of efficient and final causation—to everything else, espe-
cially to the rational creature. It is in this way that the business of theology
is the  single ultimate  explanation  of  everything, the Grandest Unified
Theory, and it is for this reason that Aquinas describes its practitioner as
one “whom all the other arts diligently serve” (IaIIae.7.2, ad 3).21 And, he
insists, universal scope is just what one should expect in a rational investiga-
tion of the truth about God:
All things are considered in theology (sacra doctrina22) under the con-
cept of God, either because they are God, or because they have an
ordered relationship to God as to their source and goal. It follows from
this that the subject of this science is really God. (Ia.1.7c)
This is the case even though the intended explanatory scope of the fully
developed science is universal, as it can be only because its primary subject
is God, the  absolutely  perfect being, the  absolutely first principle, the
universal primary governor, and the universal ultimate goal.
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I hope that my already published studies of Aquinas’s Books I and II
have helped to clarify what’s meant by his characterizations of God as
absolutely perfect and as the necessarily existent ultimate source of all other
being. My aim in this book is to acquire a critical understanding of his
argued claims that God governs all of creation and (less perspicuously) that
God himself is (somehow) what all of creation is divinely directed toward.
4. Aquinas’s Derivation of Book III’s Subject Matter
Aquinas prefaces all three books of his natural theology in SCG with pas-
sages from Scripture that serve as mottoes for the three parts of his continu-
ous project. He must have selected them with great care. Coupled with his
analyses of them, those biblical passages really do illuminate his planned
philosophical investigations. He prefaces Book III with an intricate combi-
nation of three passages from two of the Psalms: “The Lord is a great God
and a great King above all gods” [Ps. 94/95:3]. “For the Lord will not cast
off his people” [Ps. 93/94:14]. “For in his hand are all the ends of the earth,
and the heights of the mountains are his. For the sea is his and he made it,
and his hands formed the dry land” [Ps. 94/95:4–5] (III.1.1891). The use
of the traditional divine titles ‘Lord’ and ‘King’ in the first of these passages
clearly introduces sovereignty or governance, one of the two divine roles
included in the specific subject matter of Book III. And the immediate
continuation of Psalm 94/95 in the third passage suggests that being the
universal sovereign is a consequence of being the universal creator.23 But
neither of those selections from Psalm 94/95 provides any hint of God’s
role as the ultimate goal of the existence of every created thing, the other
principal topic of Book III. Aquinas clearly intends to supply such a hint
with his interpolation of the first half of Psalm 93/94:14 as the second of
these passages.24 But, even generously interpreted, the passage is applicable
to God only as the ultimate goal (somehow), of human existence. And while
it’s fair to grant that this may count as the most important aspect of God’s
role as the universal ultimate goal, it is also likely to seem a good deal less
in need of explanation than the notion of a divine goal for non-human,
non-cognitive, non-living nature as well. As we shall see, Aquinas does begin
to  clarify even  that  broader, more difficult notion in the body of this
introductory chapter, but not until he has sketched a derivation of the
subject matter of Book III from the topics of the two preceding books.
He starts the sketch with simple summaries of the accomplishments of
Books I and II:
That there is one that is first among beings, possessing the full perfec-
tion of all being, which we call God, has been shown in earlier parts [of
this work, particularly in Book I]. Out of the abundance of his perfec-
tion God imparts being to all existing things, so that he is fully proven
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[in Book II] to be not only the first among beings, but also the source
of all of them. (1.1862)
What is said about creation in this second sentence is, on the face of it,
compatible with either a necessitarian or a non-necessitarian account of
God’s creating some world or other.25 However, it’s immediately apparent
that in Aquinas’s view the logical transition from creation to providence
depends not just on God’s being the source of all beings but, more precisely,
on Aquinas’s own non-necessitarian account of the way in which God is so:
Now he bestows being on other things not by the necessity of [his] nature
but rather in accordance with the decision of his will (as is clear from things
said earlier [in II.23]).26 And so it follows that he is Lord (Dominus) of
the things he has made, since we are in control (dominamur) of the
things that are subject to our will. (1.1862)
The inference Aquinas carries out in these two sentences is intended
to show that the mode of God’s creating entails his Lordship, his govern-
ance of creation. One of his two premises is unimpeachable: we are in
control of the things that are subject to our will. As for the other premise,
I’ve registered my misgivings about the non-necessitarianism he expresses
in it, but I’ll grant it here for the sake of questioning this argument’s
validity.27 Since Aquinas makes our sort of control of or dominion over
things  a  part  of  his argument,  it’s  relevant to point  out that  we, too,
sometimes make things, bring things into being, not by the necessity of our
nature but in accordance with the free decision of our will. But while the
making of those things is within our control, the things once made are very
often not entirely, or even at all, subject to our will or within our control.
The building of a house is very largely subject to the builder’s will; the house
once built is seldom if ever within the builder’s control to anything like that
same extent. The sentences we write are subject to our will while we’re
composing them; but they begin to slip out of our control as soon as they’re
written down where they can be read and interpreted by others. And so it
really does not follow from the premises Aquinas supplies here that God is
Lord of the things he has made. Nothing in these premises taken together
guarantees that created things remain within the creator’s control once
they are in being.
However, Aquinas goes on at once to strengthen his case in a further
argument:
But God has perfect control over things produced by him, because he
needs the help of no external agent or of any foundation of matter in
order to produce them; for he is the universal producer of the totality
of being. (1862)
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Aquinas’s explanation of perfect control here alludes to his earlier account
of creation as doubly universal production: God as the primary producer of
every other being, producing each of them in complete independence of
any sort of pre-existent stuff—God as the creator of absolutely everything
out of absolutely nothing.28 And, of course, none of our producing is like
that. We always do need the help of external agents and the foundation of
matter in order to produce anything. Still, it’s not clear that even doubly
universal production confers on the producer perfect control over all the
producer’s products.
The  issue here  isn’t merely logical. Aquinas, after all, has already
argued for the freedom of created wills, a doctrine that will be even more
obviously essential to his work throughout Book III.29 And if his observation
that “we are in control of the things that are subject to our will” means what
it needs to mean in order to serve as one of his premises, then nothing
outside us, no external agent, should be in control of our wills. How could
Aquinas assimilate God’s Lordship to our dominion over the things that are
subject to our wills if he thought that our wills themselves were externally
controlled, even by God himself?30
The impression of theological causal determinism in this passage is
strengthened in the remainder of Aquinas’s introduction to Book III, as
we’ll see; but it’s a misleading impression. It will obviously be crucial for
Aquinas to establish a place for genuine human freedom within divinely
governed creation, and it will turn out that he also needs the concept of
chance in his account of the divinely governed activities of creatures.31 But,
in this opening stage of his introduction to providence, Aquinas, intent on
establishing a logical connection between creation and providence, isn’t yet
addressing those issues.
5. The Directedness of Things
In his introductory chapter, Aquinas offers one more argument in support
of God’s universal, perfect control of creation; but in the course of this last
argument to that effect we can begin to see an opening for a measure of
divinely ordered independence on the part of creatures.
Now of things that are produced by means of an agent’s will, each is
directed toward a certain end by the agent, since the proper object of
a will is something that is good, and an end.32 It’s for that reason that
things that proceed from a will are necessarily directed toward some
end.33(1.1863)
While these observations about agency and will are general, God is the only
agent at issue here; thus, this argument, too, is apparently headed in the
direction of theological determinism. But the very next sentence contains
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the first faint sign of creaturely autonomy in the ordering of nature: “How-
ever, each thing achieves [its] ultimate end through its own action, which
must be directed toward the end by the one who gave things the principles
through which they act” (1.1863). Even creatures that have free wills of their
own must get their active principles—their natural faculties for action—and
their ultimate ends from their creator; that’s part of what it is to be a
creature. Nonetheless, “each thing achieves [its] ultimate end through its
own action,” through its own use of its natural faculties for action, even
though that use “must be directed toward the end” by God.
The degree of autonomy that is being ascribed to creatures in that
sentence depends on the way in which and the degree to which their own
action is thought to be necessarily directed by their creator-governor. Aqui-
nas turns his attention to those issues after drawing this conclusion to his
argument:
Therefore, it is necessary that God, who is universally perfect in him-
self, and who by his power imparts being to all beings, be the governor
of all beings—himself directed by none [of them], of course. Nor is
there anything that is exempt from his governance (regimine), just as
there is nothing that does not acquire [its] being from him. Therefore,
as he is perfect in being and in causing, so is he also perfect in
governing. (1.1864)
Although this conclusion tends to reinforce the impression of theological
determinism, the glimmer of creaturely autonomy in the argument just
before it reaches its conclusion suggests that we might bear in mind the
possibility of distinguishing between the (absolutely universal) extent of
God’s power over creatures and the (perhaps restricted) degree to which
he exercises it. More promisingly, we can suppose what will turn out to
be very  nearly what Aquinas is going to  maintain:  that  the God-given
natures of some creatures entail an irreducible degree of autonomy in
their activities.
But even at this stage of Aquinas’s introduction to providence we can
gather from the argument we’ve been examining that God’s governance
consists in providing for each created thing at least (a) its ultimate
end—that is, whatever is best for its nature; (b) the principles or faculties
that equip it to act in ways that tend toward that end; and (c) some direction
on its way toward its ultimate end. God’s providing (a) and (b) is naturally
associated with his creating; only (c) is specifically associated with God’s
governing of creation, one of the two principal topics of Book III. But since
(a) and (b) are presented here as also concerned with the ultimate end or
goal of created existence—the other principal topic of Book III—they, too,
are now tied into the new subject matter.
The fact that creating a thing involves (a) building into it a natural
tendency toward its ultimate end means that created existence itself entails
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a specifying limitation on possibilities. To be a created thing is to be some
kind of thing; and to be one kind of thing rather than another is to have
one set of specifying potentialities rather than another; and for a thing to
achieve its foreordained specific perfection, its ultimate end, is for it to
actualize fully its specifying potentialities. But those nested limitations on
possibilities  are simply  a consequence  of the  distinguishing of  created
things into species and are not to be confused with theological determinism
of a sort that would exclude creaturely autonomy.34 Moreover, (b) God’s
providing of appropriate principles of action along with other specifying
potentialities of created things is all that enables any of them to achieve
anything “through its own action.” This prerequisite of autonomy certainly
can’t in itself be considered a curtailment of autonomy. It is, as we’ve
expected, only (c) God’s directing of created things on their way to their
specifically ultimate goals that could bring with it the kind of theological
determinism that would be incompatible with human freedom.
In the remainder of his introductory chapter Aquinas takes a first step
toward dispelling the impression of theological determinism by explaining
that the universal divine governance has to be manifested differently in its
application to different natures. He develops an analysis of the different
manifestations of divine governance based on an exhaustive classification
of just three very broadly distinguished kinds of created things:
The effect of this governance, of course appears in various ways in
connection with various things, in accordance with the difference of
their natures. Some things are produced by God in such a way that,
having intellect, they bear his likeness and represent his image. For that
reason they are not only directed; instead, they also direct themselves
toward their requisite (debitum) end in accordance with their own
actions. (1.1865)
Along with all other created things, intellective creatures such as human
beings are subject to, dependent on, divine direction.35 But simply in virtue
of their intellectivity, the respect in which they most resemble God, “they
also direct themselves . . . in accordance with their own actions.” This
autonomy of human beings, entailed by their intellectivity, isn’t absolute, of
course. The one requisite end toward which we all naturally direct our-
selves, however it is to be identified, is an essential aspect of our nature. But
our intellects’ conceptions of that end are largely up to us, and they can and
do vary widely. And there is further room for autonomy in the fact that even
those of us who share a conception of the ultimate goal of human existence
can and do choose very different means of achieving it.36
Among alternative conceptions of the goal and alternative routes to-
ward it, some are likely to be mistaken; and autonomy of course involves
responsibility for mistakes. And so, even in this preliminary survey, Aquinas
points ahead to the critical importance of rationality (or its manifestation
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in morality) for human beings’ self-directed progress toward the goal di-
vinely predetermined for them:
If they submit (subdantur) to divine governance in their own directing
[of themselves], they are enabled to achieve the ultimate end on the
basis of divine governance. But if they proceed otherwise (secus) in
their own directing [of themselves], they are held back. (1.1865a)
Since Aquinas has just picked out intellective creatures as distinguished by
their degree of autonomy, their submission to divine governance couldn’t
possibly amount to an abdication of their essential freedom and responsi-
bility in any degree but must, instead, be their freely chosen actualizing of
the specifying potentiality that is intellectivity, their approximating more
nearly the divine likeness they bear. He is, as I say, pointing ahead and not
yet arguing for these claims; but even this preliminary announcement is
enough to show us why morality will have to be among the subjects investi-
gated in Book III.
Having provided a sketch of the complicated way divine governance is
manifested in connection with intellective creatures, Aquinas turns to what
should be a much simpler introductory account of the directedness of
nonintellective things. “However, other things, lacking intellect, do not
direct themselves toward their end, but are directed by another” (1865b).
The other-directedness of such things is typically not ad hoc (like the
archer’s directing of the arrow) but is manifested rather in biological,
chemical, and physical tendencies built into them by their creator. That
much is true of all of them. But Aquinas’s account of them is especially
simple as regards the heavenly bodies, those nonintellective things that he,
following Aristotle, mistakenly believed to be incorruptible:
Some of those [nonintellective] things, being incorruptible, cannot
undergo any defect in natural being; and so neither can they in any way
deviate from the directedness toward the end that has been preestab-
lished for them. Instead, they are unfailingly subject to the governance
of the primary governor. Of this sort are the heavenly bodies, the
movements of which always go on uniformly.37 (1865b)
The outmoded astrophysics that characterizes this passage leaves it almost
valueless as a contribution to this preview. But it does contain one incidental
hint of important developments to come when it suggests that not only any
defect in a thing’s natural being but also any deviation in its movement or
activity from the directedness that has been preestablished for it would
count as a sort of corruption of it.
That broader sense of corruption underlies Aquinas’s elaborate analy-
sis of various kinds of badness in III.4–15, and it makes one more appear-
ance here in his introductory chapter in a slightly more developed form, in
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his preliminary account of the manifestation of divine governance over
nonintellective things that are also corruptible.38 “However, other things,
[lacking intellect and] being corruptible, can undergo a defect of natural
being. It is, nonetheless, made up for by the advance of something else. For
when one of them is corrupted, another is generated” (1.1865c). Although
Aquinas’s concern so far is with corruption only in the sense of a defect of
natural being, his account of it is immediately complicated by his introduc-
ing a theory of universal compensation for corruption in that sense—as if
he’s anticipating a need to defend God’s governance of nature against an
accusation of wholesale failure, a very broad version of the problem of evil,
one that would arise even if the world contained no instances of suffering,
human  or otherwise, but was  simply characterized by  familiar sorts of
natural change and decay. In any case, the corruption/generation theory
of “natural being” adumbrated here and developed in the early chapters of
Book III (as we shall see) is, I think, defensible and will play an essential role
in Aquinas’s analysis of the varieties of badness.
But he couples this theory at once with a corruption/generation
theory of “proper actions” that will prove to be more problematic. He
begins with a claim that needs no special evidence, observing as regards all
nonintellective and corruptible things that “in their proper actions they do
[sometimes] fall  away from the natural  order”  (1.1865c).  But,  without
offering any supporting argument here, he immediately adds the claim that
that defect [also] is compensated for through some good arising from
it. From this it is apparent that not even those things that seem to deviate
from the ordering of the primary governance evade the primary gov-
ernor’s power. For as these corruptible bodies were established by God
himself, so are they perfectly subject to God’s power.39 (1865c)
What Aquinas means by this part of his corruption/generation theory and
how he means to support it remain to be seen. But at this preliminary stage
of our investigation, a wait-and-see attitude seems appropriate, if perhaps a
little generous.
6. Aquinas’s Plan for Book III
The single chapter in which Aquinas introduces Book III concludes, as
might be expected, with his outline of the book’s 162 remaining chapters.
But he  sets  the  stage  for the outline by  reminding us, again,  that  he
conceives of all three parts of his natural theology as contributions to
perfect-being theology, to the study of God.
Therefore, since in the first Book we dealt with the perfection of the
divine nature, while in the second Book we dealt with the perfection of
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his power in so far as he is the producer and Lord of all things, in this
third Book we have still to deal with his perfect authority or majesty
(dignitate) in so far as he is the end and governor of all things.40
(1.1867a)
The chapters of Book III, then, must cover both those aspects of divine
providence: God as the ultimate goal of all created existence, and God’s
variously directing all things toward the goal that is (somehow) himself.
Therefore, we will have to proceed in the following order, so as to deal,
first, with God himself in so far as he is the end of all things [chaps.
2–63]; second, with his universal governance, in so far as he governs
every created thing [chaps. 64–110]; and, third, with his special govern-
ance, in so far as he governs creatures that have intellect [chaps.
111–163]. (1.1867b)
We will, of course, find subdivisions within those three broad topics as
we go along. For now, it will be enough to provide a preliminary sketch of
the subdivisions in the first of them. In III.2–15, Aquinas begins the devel-
opment by focusing on the concept of an end or goal, which he analyzes as
necessarily involving goodness, a result that seems to lead him to examine
the apparent prevalence of various sorts of badness in the goals and devel-
opments of created things. In III.16–24 he undertakes to explain just how
God himself is to be considered the ultimate goal of things in general. In
III.25–37, he argues for the central importance of human beings’ intellec-
tive cognition of God in their achieving the ultimate goal of human exist-
ence, and in III.38–47, he explores various conditions that he argues must
apply to human cognition in those special circumstances. Finally, in
III.48–63, he concludes his development of the first of those three grand
topics by trying to show just how an intellective cognition of God is the
principal ingredient in ultimate human happiness.
II. AGENTS, ACTIONS, AND ENDS
1. Thoroughgoing Teleology
Aquinas concludes his introductory chapter by announcing that his first
task in Book III, a task to which he devotes sixty-two chapters, is to investi-
gate “God himself in so far as he is the end of all things” (1.1867b). That
compressed description of a very big topic is likely to arouse some misgiv-
ings. Why should we think that absolutely all things do have ends or goals?
Even if we’re given good reasons to think that they do, why should we think
that all those ends or goals converge in a single end for all things? And even
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